As a small country dependent on foreign trade and investment, North Korea should be highly vulnerable to external economic pressure. In June 2009, following North Korea's second nuclear test, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1874, broadening existing economic sanctions and tightening their enforcement. However, an unintended consequence of the nuclear crisis has been to push North Korea into closer economic relations with China and other trading partners that show little interest in cooperating with international efforts to pressure North Korea, let alone in supporting sanctions. North Korea appears to have rearranged its external economic relations to reduce any impact that traditional sanctions could have. Given the extremely high priority the North Korean regime places on its military capacity, it is unlikely that the pressure the world can bring to bear on North Korea will be sufficient to induce the country to surrender its nuclear weapons. The promise of lifting existing sanctions may provide one incentive for a successor government to reassess the country's military and diplomatic positions, but sanctions alone are unlikely to have a strong effect in the short run. Yet the United States and other countries can still exercise some leverage if they aggressively pursue North Korea's international financial intermediaries as they have done at times in the past.
following the country's first nuclear test. North Korea, claiming that the Security Council's action was a violation of its sovereignty and even an act of war, withdrew from the Six Party Talks, announced its intention to reprocess spent fuel rods into fissile material, and ultimately undertook a second nuclear test on May 25. When South Korea responded by joining the Proliferation Security Initiative, North Korea announced that it would no longer be bound by the terms of the 1953 armistice. Following the passage of UNSCR 1874 in June, North Korea once again escalated, claiming that it would weaponize all recently reprocessed plutonium, commence a uranium enrichment program, and provide a "decisive military response" to any "blockade" against the country.
In seeking to interpret North Korean actions, it is important to be frank about how little we know.
There are ample reasons to believe that the country's behavior is driven not by the external environment but by complex domestic developments that include Kim Jong-il's health, succession struggles, shifts in the power of internal factions, and economic changes that have weakened the government's hold over a fraying socialist system. We should not believe that fine-tuning incentives-in the form of either carrots or sticks-will necessarily succeed; much will depend on developments in Pyongyang as well.
However, whether the five parties (the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia) renew the push for a negotiated settlement, ratchet up external pressure, or both, it is useful to have some understanding of recent changes in the North Korean economy and its external economic relations. These changes provide important clues to North Korea's intentions and are likely to affect the use of either sanctions or further economic inducements.
We make two major points, one having to do with North Korea's domestic political economy, and the second with its foreign sector. First, there is strong evidence from as early as 2005 that the leadership has become increasingly wary of economic reform. Our assessments of the causes of this shift are necessarily speculative. The onset of the nuclear crisis and a more "hostile" international environment clearly do not favor reform, but important domestic dynamics are in play as well. The leadership has clearly reverted to a more control-oriented-even Stalinist-approach to economic policy.
This set of policy changes has important implications for our understanding of North Korean intentions as well as for strategies of economic engagement. General economic inducements, such as the lifting of sanctions, entry into the international financial institutions (IFIs), or more-formalized regional cooperation, have not been as significant for the North Korean leadership as proponents of engagement believed they would be. The regime has always favored targeted transfers that can be directly controlled by the leadership, such as food aid, heavy fuel oil shipments, or-even better-straight cash payments such as those secured from the 2000 North-South summit and the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mt.
Kumgang projects. But if anything, the current appeal of general economic inducements is even less than it has been historically. Moreover, the prospect that reform would moderate North Korean behavior-a core assumption of the engagement approach-has proven a chimera.
The second, and apparently contradictory, set of observations concerns the evolution of North Korea's trade and investment. Despite the recent antireformist turn and the constraints of the second nuclear crisis, North Korea has in fact become more economically open. However, the geographic composition of North Korea's trade has shifted quite fundamentally. Trade with Japan has virtually collapsed after Tokyo implemented an embargo. Trade with Europe stagnated following the onset of the nuclear crisis, while trade, investment, and particularly aid from South Korea fell following the inauguration of Lee Myung-bak and especially in 2009. At the same time, North Korea's dependence on China has grown dramatically in both absolute and relative terms. In addition, North Korea has sought out other partners that do not pose sanctions risks or with whom North Korea's nuclear and missile interests are aligned, most notably Iran, Syria, and potentially Egypt.
These shifts in trade patterns have important implications for the recent UN sanctions effort and any complementary actions that the United States or other countries might choose to take in the aftermath of the May nuclear test. North Korea's changing trade patterns make it much more difficult, although not impossible, to pursue an effective sanctions strategy. In the absence of robust cooperation from China, policy would have to target North Korea's international financial ties or even employ the direct interdiction of trade by sea or air; UNSCR 1874 takes important, but by no means decisive, steps in this direction.
Our discussion proceeds in four stages. In the first section, we provide a brief overview of the development of the North Korean economy from the collapse of the Soviet Union to the onset of the second nuclear crisis. We emphasize the impact of the great famine of the mid-1990s on what we call "marketization from below," the tentative policy changes that culminated in the economic reforms of July 2002, and the evidence of "reform in reverse" since 2005.
In the second section, we trace the evolution of the external sector, noting the ongoing ability of the country to finance a substantial current account deficit and the steady diversification of its foreign economic relations. Of particular interest is the growth in North Korea's trade and investment with other developing countries, most notably in the Middle East, and the related concerns about proliferation activities.
We then examine in greater detail the changing economic relationship with China and South Korea following important political breakthroughs with both countries in [2000] [2001] . We show the growing weight of China in North Korea's external economic relations, the increasingly commercial nature of these ties, and the minimal impact the missile and nuclear tests of 2006 had on the growth of ChinaNorth Korea trade and investment. These patterns contrast with North-South economic relations, which have been highly political under South Korean presidents Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Lee Myung-bak.
In the final section, we provide an overview of the sanctions imposed under UNSCR 1874. The resolution sent an important political signal and included several ground-breaking precedents, such as a right to monitor, and perhaps interdict, suspected arms sales. Nonetheless, the sanctions are crafted cautiously and are likely to have limited effect in the absence of complementary actions by the five parties, including not only additional constraints but the olive branch of a return to negotiations.
The NorTh KoreAN ecoNomy: 1990-2009
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the North Korean economy went into a steep decline, culminating in one of the most destructive famines of the twentieth century (Haggard and Noland 2007a) . As many as one-million people-five percent of the entire population-perished in the mid1990s. The causes of this collapse were multiple, including long-run distortions associated with the socialist growth model as well as the lost opportunities for reform that occurred as a result of the first nuclear crisis of 1993-94. However, the failure to adjust to the rapid decline of Soviet support is the ultimate reason for the collapse of the North Korean economy in the middle of the decade. When the Soviet Union, then Russia, abandoned friendship prices and aid in favor of hard currency payments for its exports, both the industrial and agricultural sectors of North Korea went into a secular decline. The floods of 1995 were only a final shock, but they cannot be held solely or even primarily responsible for the economic collapse and famine, North Korean arguments to the contrary.
In response to the crisis, the North Korean economy began to undergo a profound transformation that we call "marketization from below." Households, work units, local party organs, government offices, and even military units all scrambled for food. In doing so, they initiated barter and trade and ventured into new, monetized economic activities. Markets began to play a more important role both in generating household income and as a source for retail purchases, including food and eventually a wider range of consumer goods.
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A 2008 survey we conducted of 300 North Korean refugees living in South Korea provides insight into the extent of this process of informal marketization. We asked respondents whether, in addition to their regular work, they engaged in other economic activities. 70.9 percent said they had engaged in trading, 8.9 percent in private services, 18.9 percent in "other" business activities, and 14.9 percent in August 3 units, entrepreneurial businesses run out of the traditional state-owned enterprises. A surprising 69 percent of all respondents said that they secured over 50 percent of their income from private business activities, and 46 percent said they secured all of their income from private activities.
The results for household income were mirrored on the expenditure side: Less than 10 percent of the respondents in our survey said that their primary source of food at the time they left North Korea was the state-run public distribution system (PDS) of quantity rationing or their workplaces. Moreover, there is little difference in this response across different dates of departure; if anything, reliance on the market appears to have gone up over time. The two most common responses by far to our questions about respondents' primary source of food were that respondents bought food on the market (37.0 percent) or that they grew it themselves (27.9 percent).
At the peak of the famine and in its immediate aftermath the regime had little choice but to allow this marketization from below. The crucial question was whether the government would ratify these developments with complementary policy reforms. In 1998 the leadership introduced constitutional revisions that tentatively broadened the space for economic activity outside direct state control. External political developments provided some additional hints of an economic opening; these developments included the 2000 North-South summit, the resumption of high-level visits with China in 2000 and 2001, and the Koizumi summit of 2002. These important diplomatic developments appeared to confirm that political engagement and economic reform were mutually reenforcing. A relaxation of tensions provided the space for the domestic reform effort, but a greater focus on the necessity of reform also motivated the leadership to broaden its foreign political and economic relations.
The regime effectively ratified these developments with a set of policy changes announced in July 2002. There are ample grounds for criticizing this reform as a limited and flawed effort; we discuss it in 1. The development of a market for food was also aided by substantial diversion of the large inflow of food aid that began to arrive beginning in 1995. more detail elsewhere.
2 Nonetheless, it did decriminalize some of the market activities that had sprung up during the famine (for example, by allowing the continued growth of controlled markets) and began or continued incremental reforms of the cooperatives (for example, by reducing the size of work teams) and of state-owned enterprises (for example, by granting greater managerial autonomy).
Yet the timing of the reform proved highly inauspicious. Within months of the launching of the 2002 reforms, the second nuclear crisis had broken. In the context of improving harvests and relatively generous aid from South Korea and China, an internal debate over the merits of reform continued through 2005, primarily in the form of controversy over the weight that should be given to the military and heavy industrial sectors as opposed to light industry and agriculture (Carlin and Wit 2006) .
However, by 2005 signs had begun to emerge that economic hardliners were winning the policy battles.
We consider briefly four examples of "reform in reverse":
n Developments in the food economy, including efforts to revive the PDS; n The restrictive response of the government to the development of markets; n The management of border trade; n Government statements with respect to overall development strategy, most notably in the joint New Year's editorial of 2009. it is important to recall that, North Korean claims notwithstanding, the external environment was not entirely hostile. To the contrary, the unconditional aid provided by South Korea and China provided the government with resources that could be used to reconstitute state control over the economy.
We are more inclined to the theory that the top leadership and/or conservative forces within the regime came to believe that marketization from below was corrosive to state power. The leadership does 2. See Haggard and Noland (2007a) 176-191. 3. For an analysis of the military's expanding role in the North Korean economy under the songun policy see Toloraya (2008) . Toloraya argues that the military opposes economic reform and marketization. Yet the existing military leadership could be a beneficiary of reform and opening. North Korea could experience a large "peace dividend" as part of its millionman army was demobilized and put to work on civilian projects such as the rehabilitation of infrastructure. At least some of the military leadership could reinvent themselves as businessmen. See Noland (2000) 302-3 for a quantitative assessment.
not appear confident-as the Chinese Communist Party was-that it can maintain a political monopoly while simultaneously pursuing economic reform. As will be seen, a recurrent theme of recent economic policy is the revealed preference to reassert control over an economic order that appears to be spinning out of the central government's control.
The Breakdown and reconstitution of the Public Distribution System
Prior to the great famine of the mid-1990s, the government set production quotas for the cooperatives, provided farmers with rations at the time of the harvest, and distributed food to urban residents at nominal prices through the PDS; markets played virtually no role in the allocation of grain. During the famine, the PDS broke down, and households relied on the market, barter, private farming activities, and other private activities such as foraging. The influx of foreign aid in the late-1990s provided the basis for a partial revival of the PDS, as donors had no independent channels for distributing food. But the process of marketization continued apace driven by partial reforms in the food sector, such as allowing some private plots and expanding the role of farmers' markets. The diversion of food aid and cooperative output into the market and growing commercial trade in food across the Chinese border also contributed to the growth of market activity.
However, the government has periodically tried to reinstate the PDS and to exercise control over the market for food and grain in particular. In August 2005 the government decided to reinstate the PDS as of October 1 and to ban private trading in grain. These actions were taken in conjunction with the announcement that the World Food Program (WFP) would be asked to leave North Korea. The ability of the government to implement this policy varied across the country, and eventually the government was forced to quietly shelve the policy, as PDS sites were not able to meet targets and markets for grain began to reemerge. Nonetheless, the effort to revive the PDS involved increased efforts to extract food from the cooperatives, even in contravention of the rules determining the disposition of cooperative farm output. It is doubtful that these efforts at control have been successful; indeed, the recurrence of new control efforts is almost certainly a sign of their failure. Age restrictions can be circumvented by bringing grandparents into the market. Regulated markets-and efforts to close them-have given rise to "alley markets" that shift trading to new venues. Traders undoubtedly bribe inspectors as well. However, the restrictions have nonetheless sowed uncertainty about alternative sources of livelihood for households, and in 2008 did so just as soaring food prices forced households to seek other sources of income and barter.
There is also some evidence that the efforts to exercise control over markets may influence cross- The episode reveals the complex pressures on local officials squeezed between the dictates of Pyongyang, the absence of resources, mounting political and social pressures, and the risks of further repression.
The Border Problem
The dramatic increase in trade with China has resulted in the creation of dense business networks that include major Chinese and North Korean enterprises, smaller Chinese and North Korean businesses, and North Koreans with relatives in China who are permitted to travel, albeit only with the greatest of difficulty. The major land ports on the North Korean side of the border, particularly Sinuiju, have become not only trading centers but major distribution hubs for the rest of the country.
But the border poses profound challenges to the North Korean leadership. When economic circumstances deteriorate, the incentives rise to move into China either permanently or in search of business opportunities and food. With this movement comes the gradual breakdown of the government's monopoly on information about the outside world and a corresponding difficulty in maintaining the regime's mythology about the superiority of the socialist system. The border also poses a variety of more-direct economic problems. Illicit border trade in drugs, particularly methamphetamines, has been widely reported as has the smuggling of scrap metal and other products that reflect the looting of state-owned enterprises and public infrastructure.
Prior to changes in the North Korean penal code in 2004, a person who illegally crossed a "frontier of the Republic" faced a sentence of up to three years in a political penal labor colony, or gwalliso, but those who did not appear politically dangerous were sent to a village unit labor camp, where they would spend between three months and three years in forced labor. Those classified as "political offenders" faced more-severe penalties. In "serious" cases, defectors or asylum seekers were subjected to indefinite terms In an interesting signal of the seriousness attached to this issue and concerns about the pervasiveness of corruption along the border, the police have even been granted new authority to incarcerate without going through prosecutors and to exercise some control over border security agents and even military personnel.
The economic implications of these new restrictions are impossible to estimate; the illicit border trade is relatively small and remittances passed through informal channels are unlikely to be very large either. However, the border has represented a partial escape valve both through movement and trade, and the obvious opportunities for growth that would come from greater openness and movement across the border are foregone.
economic Strategy: The January 2009 Joint editorial and the return to chollima
At roughly the same time that the leadership introduced the concept of military-first politics, or songun, it also rolled out the goal of creating a "strong and prosperous nation." This nationalist concept is plastic enough to accommodate a variety of means for achieving it; indeed it could be used as a political device to jettison more-problematic aspects of state socialism and the concept of self-reliance, or juche, and to initiate wide-ranging reforms. Such an approach has historical antecedents that include the Meiji Restoration (to whose slogans current North Korean formulations bear more than a passing resemblance)
as well as the founding of modern Turkey under Mustafa Kemal.
However, the 2009 New Year's joint editorial, a crucial document setting the general outlines of policy for the year, suggests that reformist forces are in retreat. 4 The most general theme of the editorial is a return to the mobilizational development strategies of the 1950s Chollima movement, culminating in the public announcement of a "150-day speed battle campaign" in May. 5 The editorial directly quotes Kim Jong-il on this point: "The whole country and all the people, as in those years of bringing about a great Chollima upsurge after the war, should launch a general offensive dynamically, sounding the advance for opening the gate to a great, prosperous and powerful nation, united closely around the Party with one mind and purpose."
With respect to sectoral priorities, the editorial leads with the metal industry as "the mainstay of our independent socialist economy," and gives pride of place to other heavy-industry sectors, including machine building and chemicals. Early pronouncements within the party contained quite precise production goals: to generate 7.76 million kilowatts of electricity a year, produce 33 million metric tons of metal, 13 million metric tons of coal, to move 72 million metric tons of freight, and so on. However, given shortages of both power and raw materials, the campaign reverted to strategies that would rely more directly on the mobilization of labor, such as housing construction and farming.
Of particular interest is the role that the military is seen to play in this process, not only as defender but as a strategic sector: "Great efforts should constantly be put to the development of the defense industry as required by the line of economic construction in the songun era and everything necessary be provided for it on a preferential basis." As we will see in more detail below, such a strategic focus is by no means limited to the supply of the North Korean military but seeks to upgrade North Korea's status as a major arms exporter.
4. Korean Central News Agency, "Joint New Year Editorial Issued," January 1, 2009, available at www.kcna.co.jp/ index-e.htm (accessed July 13, 2009).
5. On Chollima see Noland (2000) 63.
Whither reform?
It is important to underscore a very important point about authoritarian regimes, and particularly personalist ones: They can quickly shift directions. There is nothing about this new course that could not, in principle, be reversed were the leadership to choose to reprioritize reform. However, policy choices have political-economy as well as economic consequences. In a "virtuous cycle" model, even partial reforms can generate improved economic performance, new stakeholders, and associated demands to push the process further and tolerate increased private activity. In a "vicious cycle" model, weak or erratic commitment to reform deters investment and trade, with the result that the reforms do not appear to work. Moreover, the reversion to controls provides ample opportunities for corruption, as "gatekeepers"-those responsible for enforcing controls-are effectively granted new opportunities for rent-seeking. As a result, the reform process becomes corrupted and associated with corruption as well.
An additional source of concern has to do with the external sector. As legitimate sources of revenue decline, aid dries up, and trade sanctions are tightened, the incentives to proliferate and engage in illicit activities such as drug trafficking and counterfeiting obviously increase; we place these concerns in the broader context of the evolution of the external sector.
DeveloPmeNTS iN The exTerNAl SecTor
It is common to argue that North Korea should pursue a Chinese-style reform path, but for a number of reasons agricultural reforms are unlikely to be as central to North Korea's transformation as they were in China and Vietnam. Not only is North Korea's agricultural sector very much smaller than in those two socialist countries, but the relatively limited amount of arable land and the country's northerly latitude, short growing seasons, and vulnerability to both floods and drought all argue strongly against the prospect that the agricultural sector could lead the reform process.
Rather, the most auspicious path of transformation would be to follow a course similar, at least in broad outlines, to that of South Korea. This strategy would exploit North Korea's proximity to larger, more advanced economies (including China as well as South Korea and Japan) and use both foreign investment and multilateral assistance to support increased trade, including through investment in traderelated infrastucture (e.g., ports and export-processing zones). Investment and exports would finance not only the imports needed to revive the North Korean economy but also the food that has been in continuous short supply since the famine.
What has happened in fact? The broad development of North Korea's foreign economic relations since 1990 appears to follow developments in the economy more generally: Figure With these caveats in mind, we have taken a fairly simple approach that seeks to provide a snapshot of North Korea's trade relations since the onset of the nuclear crisis by focusing on its top ten trading partners for 2004-07. We rely primarily on KOTRA data but supplement it with data from the IMF and Several patterns stand out. The first is a high and growing dependence on developing countries.
Particularly noteworthy is the growth of trade with the Middle East, which appears to have grown roughly twice as fast as North Korea's trade with the rest of the world (figure 2). This finding is even more striking given that a number of countries that have documented trade with North Korea in arms report no trade at all, including Iran, Syria, and Yemen. It is precisely with these countries that North Korea has been engaged in proliferation activities, ranging from some role in the construction of a nuclear reactor in the Syrian desert, to missile sales, to murky "service contracts" with a range of countries in conjunction with arms exports. Topping the list of these purchasers since the onset of the second nuclear crisis are Iran, Syria, Yemen, and Vietnam, but the appearance of Myanmar on the list of top-ten recipients of North Korean exports is also of interest.
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Three countries-Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon-report nonnegligible trade on a consistent basis, and it is the data for these three that form the basis of the index reported in figure 2. As noted above, the index likely understates the true growth of trade between North Korea and the region. In addition to trade, the Egyptian conglomerate Orascom has entered into contracts for investment worth more than $500 million (Noland 2009b 
North Korea-china Trade
North Korea's trade with China during and immediately after the great famine bore important similarities to the process of marketization from below described above. Not only did work units and households engage in domestic trade in order to secure food, but those with access or proximity to the border also initiated new trading relationships with China.
Viewed from the North Korean side, these trade relations ranged from officially sanctioned trade conducted through state-owned trading companies to transactions that exploited family connections with the Korean Chinese community in the Chinese border provinces. In this latter category, some "trade"
probably included unrequited transfers to relatives. In between these two ideal types of official and private commercial interactions has been a very wide gray-area of trade that appears to have a strong commercial component, even if it is conducted by state-owned enterprises. 
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It is interesting to note that despite its proximity to China and the obvious complementarities that would come from deepening the bilateral relationship, the North Korean regime has been unwilling or unable to pursue the export-processing zone model with China. The early effort to experiment with an export-processing zone in Rajin-Sonbong faced a host of obstacles and failed to attract significant investment (Noland and Flake 1997) . Although near both China and Russia, the zone's location on the Northeast coast did not exploit existing centers of economic activity on which it could build, as the early 92 percent of investors agreed or strongly agreed that the quality of basic infrastructure was a problem for their business, and 94 percent agreed that the ban on cell phones was a constraint.
Yet property-rights concerns also figured prominently. 65 percent agreed or strongly agreed that it is risky to invest in North Korea because assets may be expropriated outright. 77 percent said that regulations in North Korea make it hard to do business, and 81 percent said that it was dangerous to invest because the government can change the rules. 54 percent of all firms in the sample said that it was necessary to bribe officials to do business in North Korea; however, among investors this share rose to 73 percent, underlining the vulnerability of investing as opposed to trading. These bribes are not trivial: 53 percent of investors claimed that they spent more than 10 percent of annual income on bribes. Although the North Koreans have accommodated substantial inflows of Chinese investment, our survey suggests that these relationships have not served to socialize the regime to international commercial practices.
Rather, they have been undertaken by state-owned enterprises and cemented through corruption. It is important to note that from the beginning, North-South trade has had a strong aid and noncommercial component. Even nominally commercial trade has a substantial strategic and noncommercial cast. The Mt. Kumgang tourist project and the KIC have involved private companies but also substantial government subsidies. These subsidies are of particular interest in the KIC case, since export-processing zones typically involve concessions and support on the part of the recipient country rather than from investors. The government also provides political risk insurance covering financial losses up to 90 percent of a company's investment, up to five billion South Korean won ($5.4 million). In addition, a law passed in April 2007 allowed South Korean small and medium-sized enterprises (SME's) operating in the KIC to access supports, such as preferential finance programs, extended to SME's in the South. Koreans were declaring existing contracts with respect to land rent, land-use taxes, and wages null and void and even held a South Korean hostage at the complex on charges that he was engaged in politics.
As of this writing, North and South are engaged in a tense negotiation over what concessions, if any, the South is willing to make and thus about the very future of the entire enterprise.
Much of the discussion of the KIC saga has focused on whether the North Koreans really mean it, or whether these moves constitute efforts to renegotiate contracts on more-favorable terms. This discussion misses a central point. The real costs of recent North Korean actions include not only the KIC itself but any investment that is deterred by the propensity of the North Korean leadership to subordinate economic and reputational calculations to broader political objectives. As we have seen from the aggregate data, weak property rights do not deter foreign direct investment altogether; Chinese and other firms have invested, in some cases large amounts of money, as recent Orascom investments demonstrate. These firms have clearly found some way to secure their investments, in part through the formation of joint ventures with partners who provide not only complementary assets-typically land-but political protection as well. But such arrangements are not likely to be adequate to secure major foreign investments from South Korea, Japan, the United States, and Western Europe, even if the nuclear issue were to be resolved.
The UN SANcTioNS AND Their limiTS
Following Yet North Korean provocations also have adverse strategic consequences for China as well. To date, they have served to push South Korea, Japan, and the United States closer together and could trigger a major arms race in Northeast Asia from which China could be the loser. Security concerns have already triggered greater interest in theater missile defenses and even speculation about whether Japan would "go nuclear."
It is not beyond the realm of possibility that China has in fact reached the limits of its tolerance and that some coordinated or even unilateral action on its part might be forthcoming. It is still too soon to tell what China will do, but preliminary signals suggest an increased willingness to impose limited sanctions.
But the history of sanctions suggests that they are unlikely to induce countries to abandon core political goals, which the nuclear weapons program appears to be in the North Korean case (Hufbauer et al. 2007 ). It would take draconian sanctions rigorously applied by China and South Korea in concert with others to have a plausible chance of attaining this goal, and this outcome appears unlikely to be obtained.
In the absence of such coordination, the United States can still exercise leverage if it can identify how and where North Korea finances its international trade and goes aggressively after financial intermediaries as it did in the Banco Delta Asia case. As we have argued, this particular form of sanction does not require multilateral coordination, although North Korea has undoubtedly taken steps to try to minimize this risk.
As a small country increasingly dependent on foreign trade and investment, North Korea would appear highly vulnerable to external economic pressure. But given the extreme priority that the regime places on its military capacity, it is unlikely that the pain the world can bring to bear will be sufficient to induce North Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons. Moreover, the change in North Korea's trading partners has served to mitigate the risk of such sanctions, at least to some extent. The promise of lifting existing sanctions may constitute one incentive for a successor government to reassess the country's military and diplomatic positions, but we should not expect them to have a strong effect in the short run, particularly if the country's behavior is driven by domestic political considerations.
A third conclusion has to do with the incentives of proliferation activities. There is some evidence that North Korea moderated its missile proliferation activities during periods when rapprochement with the United States, and to a lesser extent Japan, was a priority; the late Clinton period provides an example. However, in the absence of such an interest, the incentives to engage in arms transfers increase.
Indeed, they arguably become greater because of the declining prospects for trade, investment, and assistance from the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Western Europe. Given that the United
States has even less leverage over customers such as Iran and Syria than it does over China, the only policy options for dealing with this particular form of trade expansion are much more direct, including sanctions on North Korea's Middle Eastern trading partners or a test of the direct interdiction model that is the untested core of the PSI.
A fourth conclusion concerns the more-transformative conception of engagement that undergirded the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations' approaches to North Korea. The engagement bet was not an irrational one. If North Korea had embarked on a more-robust reformist path, the postulated mechanisms of long-run transformation through engagement might well have taken place. Increased trade, investment, and aid would have contributed not only to a deeper engagement in the world economy but been part and parcel of an internal transformation as well.
Yet as we have seen, the North Korean economy is structured in such a way that outside economic ties are still largely monopolized by state-owned enterprises and other gatekeepers, such as the military in the case of the KIC. Under such circumstances, the precise design of engagement policies requires very close scrutiny. Direct transfers to the regime obviously will not have the same transformative effects as private investment and trade. Even nominally commercial relations can be exploited if the North Korean counterparties believe that these relations are ultimately political in nature, subsidized, and thus vulnerable to blackmail; again, the KIC is an important example. If economic ties are truly commercial in nature, those choosing to trade and invest with North Korea do so at their own risk. Under these circumstances, private actors will make economic decisions fully factoring in political risk, and North Korea will bear the costs if it chooses to renege on commitments or fails to provide a welcoming policy environment.
Finally, we conclude by underlining that the international community faces what might be called a "latent" humanitarian problem with respect to North Korea. These concerns were muted by a somewhat better-than-expected harvest in 2008, and probably by commercial purchases of food in the winter and early spring of 2008-09. 11 Even if North Korea does muddle through this crop cycle and the termination of the 500,000 metric ton food aid program, there is little indication that the country is capable of feeding itself. As a result, the prospect of a recurrence of food shortages in the medium term is high. As in the past, the peculiar difficulty of dealing with North Korea stems in part from the humanitarian dilemma the country poses to the international community: It is difficult to turn away from the substantial suffering that the regime imposes on its own population, but increasingly unproductive to extend economic assistance in the face of entrenched resistance to broader reforms. 
